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"FOR OUR OWN GOOD:" FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE
TORT LAW-RISK, REGULATION, AND THE GOALS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
JOHN ROBERTSON*
The present labyrinth of environmental regulation necessarily presents
difficult interpretive choices for any reviewing court. Under the shadow of the
Supremacy Clause,' all state laws must give way to any express or implied
directive of federal law.2 Federal lawmakers, caught in a maelstrom of political
special interests, are usually far from explicit in defining the scope of such laws,
leaving the problems of interpreting statutory ambiguities and congressional intent
to the courts.3 In fact, political pressure may even persuade Congress to exclude
intentionally important protective aspects of environmental protection laws.4
Nor are regulatory agencies immune from the effects of bias and political
motivation. In attempts to reconcile the frequently divergent interests of industry
and environmental protection under a "feasible" regulatory framework, an agency
may subjectively interpret sketchy data to create "middle-of-the-road" regulations
or standards which masquerade as the result of "valid" scientific conclusions.'
While these results may be sufficient to create minimum, or "floor," standards,
the uncertain nature of these conclusions should prompt states to err on the side
of caution by allowing their citizens to protect themselves through state tort law.
With this in mind, protective state tort laws must not be preempted by
federal regulations or action for several reasons. First, utilizing subjective
scientific conclusions to neutralize tougher state laws in the name of "regulatory
uniformity" does little to further public health and environmental protection.
Second, allowing state tort actions to coexist with federal regulations will
* Mr. Robertson received his B.A. in Psychology from Pennsylvania State University in 1991 and
expects to receive his J.D. from the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the College of William and
Mary in May of 1996.
1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
2. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
3. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (deriving meaning of federal law
from principles of statutory interpretation and forensic examination of congressional intent in
legislative history).
4. One of the most important and controversial federal environmental protection statutes, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"),
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 1993), originally included a provision allowing personal
injury claims; this provision was completely excluded from the final draft before the bill became
law. See S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1980).
5. Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG.
89, 91 (1988) ("Inadequate scientific knowledge and inadequate data usually prevent derivation of
risk estimates based on reliable science.").
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efficiently help to forward environmental policy goals, remedy localized harms
which are not adequately addressed in federal law, and allow a forum for public
input into regulatory processes. Finally, the fear of court action provides the best
market incentive for industry to create more ecologically-friendly advancements
in technology and will stimulate collaboration between environmentalists and
industry to frame realistic regulatory baselines.
I. FEDERAL ACTION AND THE SCOPE OF PREEMPTION
The grand scheme of checks and balances between federal and state
powers in the United States necessarily creates a tension where regulation is
concerned. Under Supreme Court Supremacy Clause jurisprudence, federal
preemption of state law may occur by express terms in federal statutes, 6 or may
be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is comprehensive,7 or where
the federal interest is so dominant as to preclude enforcement of state laws on the
same subject.8
When state and federal powers conflict in the absence of express statutory
preemption, however, the courts are forced to wind their way through statutory
labyrinths to determine the scope of preemption through examination of
legislative intent.9 Such judicial "mind-reading" exercises are inherently flawed
because any meaning courts may find in congressional silence is contrived at best.
Silence should never be allowed to supplant traditional state police powers or
common law when the health and welfare of the public are at issue.
The attitude of the Supreme Court towards the scope of preemption has
varied over the years.'0 Presently, the Court appears reluctant to allow federal
preemption of state common and statutory law." This presumption against
preemption is evident in recent Supreme Court decisions where regulations pertain
to health or safety issues,' 2 where there is no federal remedy for the plaintiffs
6. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
7. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
8. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
9. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1990) (detailing framework of
preemption analysis).
10. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism
and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623, 626 (1975) (discussing expansion or contraction
of preemption doctrine through application of presumptions in favor of or against preemption).
11. See id. at 649.
12. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985) (blocking
preemption of state law governing blood/plasma products by Food and Drug Administration
regulations); see also Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981)
(employing deference to state regulation of safety under dormant Commerce Clause).
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injury, 3 or where Congress drafts statutes ambiguously. 4
Lower courts have attempted to balance the conflicting goals of product
safety, which are enhanced by state tort law, against product availability and use,
which is frustrated by tort liability. They have looked to whether federal
regulations strike the appropriate balance between safety and quantity or serve
only as minimum standards. 5 Federal approval of certain product designs and
warnings through extensive regulatory procedures has been held to be "not
necessarily in conflict" with jury determinations of tort liability.'6 Such holdings
are not the norm, however, and considerable variation exists among courts as to
how extensive or specific a federal regulatory statute must be before courts are
allowed to infer preemption of state law.' 7
In all cases that involve implied preemption, courts focus on the
underlying congressional intent behind federal laws or actions to determine the
scope of preemption. 8 Thus, they add a new hurdle to the route which victims
of pollution must traverse during litigation. Besides surmounting difficult proof
problems of causation, plaintiffs must also worry that courts will find that their
cause of action has been impliedly preempted by congressional intent. Ironically,
by attempting to address pollution issues at a national level, federal environmental
statutes have added a new weapon to the polluters' arsenal of litigation strategies.
An analysis of federal regulatory law indicates that this result is rarely, if ever,
consistent with the underlying goals of federal environmental protection.
13. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104
(1986) (finding no congressional intention to preempt state tort remedies by Atomic Energy Act of
1954). But see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978)
(indicating that there is no constitutional requirement that federal law, when preempting state causes
of action, "either duplicate the recovery at common law or provide a reasonable substitute remedy").
14. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516-17 (allowing express language of Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969 to preempt only those state tort claims that rely on failure to wam or
misrepresentation in federally approved warning labels but not other state tort remedies).
15. See Abbot by Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1113-14 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988) (rejecting argument that national public health purposes would be
frustrated by state tort law liability).
16. Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 662, 664-65 (D. Md. 1989) ("This is particularly
true where plaintiffs allege ... that defendants misrepresented or withheld relevant data concerning
[the product], causing the [federal agency] to base its decisions on erroneous or incomplete
information.").
17. See Hunsaker v. Surgidev Corp., 818 F. Supp. 744, 749-53 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (indicating that
"investigational devices exception" under Medical Devices Act creates both floor and ceiling of
regulatory standards which preempt any conflicting state laws having regulatory effect).
18. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)).
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A. The Federal Impetus To Regulate
In an effort to deal with increasing national pollution problems in the
1970s, Congress began to enact and strengthen a variety of federal environmental
laws. 9 These federal statutes have shouldered the primary burden of regulating
the environment because traditional common law actions were not adequate to
deal with the widespread nature of pollution in an increasingly urban society.2 °
The passage of these laws, however, was frequently prompted by immediately
apparent environmental problems-such as smog or the disappearance of
wildlife2 '-and by devastating environmental catastrophes that caused enormous
public concem-such as the Love Canal disaster and the Exxon Valdez tanker
spill. 2  As a result, because of Congress's piecemeal approach to environmental
legislation, modem policymakers have not considered the patchwork of laws a
consistent or coordinated response to larger, but less visible, environmental
problems.
23
Despite the veritable explosion of federal law concerning environmental
matters, statutory provisions for recovery of personal injuries as a result of
pollution are noticeably absent from federal legislation.24 In fact, many of these
statutes once included such provisions in their original drafts, but these provisions
were excised before the bills became law.25 As a result, the only remedies
available to private plaintiffs to redress personal injuries are those afforded by
state law.26
The omission of personal injury provisions from federal statutes does not
contradict the statutes' status as comprehensive.2 7 Some scholars and courts have
suggested that Congress did not incorporate such provisions in federal statutes
19. ZYGMUNT J. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY
244 (1992) ("The most significant development in modem environmental law in the second half of
the twentieth century has been the growth in environmental statutes that take on the anticipatory,
proactive regulatory function that the common law does not.").
20. See Thomas C. Buchele, Note, State Common Law Actions and Federal Pollution Control
Statutes: Can They Work Together?, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 609, 609 n.7 (1986).
21. SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REDUCING RISK:
SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 1 (1990) [hereinafter
REDUCING RISK].
22. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 1993), and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
("OPA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (Supp. I1 1988), were designed to deal with each of these types
of environmental disasters, respectively.
23. REDUCING RISK, supra note 21, at I.
24. See H.R. REP. No. 172(I), 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6160
(discussing various attempts to pass comprehensive oil spill cleanup legislation).
25. For instance, the original version of CERCLA once had a separate personal injury provision,
but this was eliminated before it was made law. See supra note 4.
26. See Buchele, supra note 20, at 609 (noting that federal statutes leave remedial issues largely
to state law).
27. Id. at 609 n.8.
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because they were meant to work in conjunction with state laws, thereby leaving
the question of adequate remedies for pollution to the states.2" This conclusion
is bolstered by the fact that most states have received congressional authorization
to implement their own air and water pollution control laws and hazardous waste
regulations.2 9 In addition, states have not allowed their "potent" common law
remedies to be displaced.3"
B. The Argument for Regulatory Uniformity
Polluting industries continue to assert the "preemption defense," claiming
that state tort law will interfere with interstate regulatory uniformity-regulations
which, in theory, have been carefully designed to speak comprehensively and
pervasively to national environmental concerns.3 But does state tort law unfairly
subject industry to an unpredictable mosaic of regulatory standards? The
Supreme Court addressed this argument in Ouellette v. International Paper Co.,"
in which the Court held that the Clean Water Act ("CWA") preempts the state
nuisance law of non-source states.
In Ouellette, the Court prevented Vermont from imposing its own
nuisance law on a New York paper mill's effluent discharge into Lake Champlain
because the "application of different state laws to a single 'point source' would
interfere with the carefully devised regulatory system established by the CWA."33
Moreover, the Court held that "[i]t is not enough to say that the ultimate goal of
both federal and state law is to eliminate water pollution. A state law also is
preempted if it interferes with the methods by which the federal statute was
designed to reach this goal."34 The Court noted that Congress, by establishing a
permit system, implicitly recognized that the goal of the CWA-the elimination
of water pollution--could not be achieved immediately or without incurring
28. Id. at 611-17 (noting common law actions frequently used to combat personal injuries related
to pollution, including nuisance, trespass, or theories of negligence or strict liability).
29. Shay S. Scott, Comment, Combining Environmental Citizen Suits & Other Private Theories of
Recovery, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 369, 370 (1994).
30. Id.
31. See Joseph T. McLaughlin & Kimberly A. O'Toole, FederalPreemption, C842 ALI-ABA 639,
648 (1993) (noting that federal law may preempt state law when "compliance with both is a
physical impossibility or when state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of
Congressional purposes and objectives"). Cf Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 510, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1370 (1988) (expressly allowing states to adopt more stringent standards than any imposed by
federal government).
32. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
33. Id. at 485 (citing Illinois v. Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1196 (1985)).
34. Id. at 494.
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costs."
Additionally, the Court reasoned that the national permitting system under
the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NDPES")" served
Congress's intention to establish "clear and identifiable" discharge standards."
Otherwise, were Congress to allow the states to exercise plenary power over
pollution sources that were not within their boundaries, "[i]t would be virtually
impossible to predict the standard for a lawful discharge into an interstate body
of water. Any permit issued under [federal law] would be rendered
meaningless."3
Importantly, the Court did allow the imposition of New York tort law on
the mill's discharges and stated that the burden of the state's own common law
did not subject permitees to unpredictable requirements." The Court indicated
that Congress was not totally insensitive to the interstate nature of pollution and
that the CWA affords all potentially affected states the ability to comment on the
discharge standards through a public hearing before the permit is issued.4"
Affected states may not block the issuance of the permit; blocking power is at the
discretion of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
who may deny the permit if she determines that the discharge will have an
"undue impact" on interstate waters.4 Sadly, this administrative procedure did
not adequately protect Vermont landowners who were forced to initiate court
action when their objections failed to avert the mill's dumping which made Lake
Champlain "foul, unhealthy, [and] smelly."42
The Court, as seen in this example, was extremely deferential to c
congressional judgment when the legislature creates a comprehensive body of
regulations-such as emission or discharge standards for pollutants. It is less
likely, however, that courts will infer preemption from the comprehensiveness of
agency regulations because agencies normally deal with problems in far more
detail than Congress.4 3 As a result, agencies must make their intentions clear if
they expect their regulations to be considered exclusive.44
The "expert" judgment of these regulators, however, has become the
center of controversy and increasing criticism. Though agencies were created to
35. Id.
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1342. See generally Environmental Protection Agency v. California ex rel. State
Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205-08 (1976) (describing NPDES system).
37. See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 81 (1971).
38. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 497 (citing Illinois, 731 F.2d at 414).
39. Id. at 499.
40. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
41. Id. § 1342(d)(2). But see Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 111 (1992) (finding that states
may exercise "virtual" veto power through EPA Administrator who may require upstream polluting
states to comport with standards of affected downstream states).
42. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 484 n.10.
43. Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 717-18.
44. Id.
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tackle the scientific complexity of environmental problems, they have been
surrounded and pressured by divergent public, industrial, environmental, and
political interests. As the "neutral" role of agencies has changed during the last
three decades because of these pressures, critics have debated the appropriate level
of involvement between agencies, the courts, and society in the creation of
environmental standards.4"
II. THE ROLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES IN DEFINING STANDARDS
Under the pressures and omens of national environmental deterioration,
the federal government established the EPA and similar regulatory bodies to
formulate comprehensive policies in the interests of protecting public health and
welfare.46 At the time, it was correctly postulated that environmental health was
best considered from a holistic perspective, an integrated approach to pollution
control which regarded all possible effects of contaminants in the ecosystem,
rather than the disjointed and patchwork efforts of several independent agencies. 7
Finally, it was realized that environmental policy formulation by existing
agencies, which had primary objectives separate from environmental protection,
would be affected by their own biases.48 In theory, the EPA would be able to rise
above these biases in its task as impartial arbiter of environmental and economic
considerations in the formulation of policy. Unfortunately, theory often differs
from practice.
As early as 1982, the potential for abuse and manipulation of agencies by
the industries they sought to regulate was acknowledged.49 This phenomenon of
agency bias toward the interests of regulated industries and businesses, now
dubbed the "capture" of an agency by market forces, is a commonly accepted
paradigm by the legal community. It is explained as the result of pressures on
agencies which must achieve results but must also solicit cooperation from the
regulated interests to implement effectively any regulatory procedures. This arises
from the agency's comparative dearth of resources which negatively affects its
45. Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the
Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 329 (1985) ("The legal system has no special competence to assess
and compare public risks, and the legal process is not designed or equipped to conduct the broad-
ranging, aggregative inquiries on which sensible public-risk choices are built. Expert administrative
agencies ... remain best able to regulate public risks.").
46. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623, reprintedin 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1105,
1109 n.7 (1954) (quoting letter from Attorney General to president of a railroad, speculating that
Interstate Commerce Commission would adopt railroad's perspective).
50. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmericanAdministrativeLaw, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1669,
1684-87 (1975).
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policing capabilities.5
Despite making modest headway in the creation of beneficial national
environmental regulations, agencies increasingly have been under
siege-exemplified by the attempts of the Reagan and Bush administrations to
eviscerate environmental agencies from within 2 and by the continuing
deregulatory mindset of the current Republican Congress.53 In light of the
prevalent "economic-growth-at-all-costs" attitude behind present congressional
action, it is likely that the ability of the EPA to forward its original goals will be
severely compromised.54
In its struggle to avoid controversy, the EPA has sought refuge behind a
wall of complex scientific conclusions. Regulatory judgments expressed as
scientific findings are likely to be less visible and more immune from effective
judicial or legislative review than decisions based solely on economic or political
concerns.55 This strategy can be discerned in the EPA's procedures for risk
assessment and management and in the manner by which the EPA creates
regulatory standards.
A close examination of these standards reveals that they are riddled with
speculation and uncertainty and are not grounded on reliable scientific
conclusions. 6  Yet, these standards continue to guide the courts in their
preemption cases and to define the extent to which polluters may continue their
toxic activities without public interference. Therefore, "pervasive" regulatory
schemes based on pseudo-scientific conclusions must be supplemented by state
tort actions to effectively protect the public health and welfare.
A. The Difficulty of Creating Standards: Uniformity v. Public Health
The creation of regulatory standards requires a great deal of scientific
knowledge and data which is necessary for an understanding of the complex
workings of the biosphere and surrounding ecosystems. To aid its task of
defining these standards, the EPA has enlisted the aid of scientific experts to
51. Id.
52. See Saundra Saperstein, Bay Group Says Membership Soars 65 Percent, WASH. PosT, Aug.
14, 1984, at B6. Notably, James Watt, Secretary of the Interior, and Anne Burford, Administrator
of the EPA, both abused their positions to fulfill personal and political agendas. Id.
53. See Cindy Skrzycki, Advice as a Growth Industry-In Regulatory Assault, GOP Has a Lot To
Be Thankful For, WASH. PosT, Dec. 2, 1994, at DI.
54. See Daniel P. Jones, State May Lose $17 Million in Environmental Funds, HARTFORD
COURANT, Aug. 19, 1995, at A3 (reporting that, on July 31, 1995, lawmakers approved bill which
cut EPA budget by 34 percent).
55. Latin, supra note 5, at 130 (noting that EPA Carcinogen Guidelines allow EPA decisionmakers
to use debatable outcome-oriented assumptions whenever they believe that weight of scientific
evidence warrants the assumption, even when inconsistent with previous EPA practices and risk
assessment principles widely held in scientific community).
56. Id. at 90.
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interpret data and offer advice.57 The results of this collaborative venture can be
seen in a series of publications produced by the Science Advisory Board ("SAB")
of the EPA. In 1986, the first comprehensive endeavor of this sort compared a
broad range of environmental problems on the basis of human cancer, non-cancer,
welfare, and ecological risks.58
More recently, the SAB formed a special committee called the Relative
Risk Reduction Strategies Committee ("RRRSC" or "Committee") to review the
1987 report and develop strategic options for reducing risk.59 The RRRSC touted
an impressive membership of thirty-nine "nationally-recognized" scientists,
engineers, and managers with "broad experience in addressing environmental and
health issues. 6°
The RRRSC arrived at ten recommendations detailing the strategic options
for reducing human health and ecological risks in its 1990 report.6 1 It did note,
however, that its recommendations were largely policy-oriented and that nothing
in the report should be construed as a recommendation for a specific policy
option for reducing any specific environmental risk.62 Most importantly, the SAB
recognized that, "[a]s long as there are large gaps in key data sets, efforts to
evaluate risk on a consistent, rigorous basis or to define optimum risk reduction
strategies necessarily will be incomplete, and the results will be uncertain."63
This uncertainty has prompted various commentators to note that the
scientific component of risk assessment can never remain completely free from
57. See SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS (1990).
58. REDUCING RISK, supra note 21, at 4 (1990) (discussing previous publication, UNFINISHED
BUsINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS).
59. Id. at 5.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 6. These recommendations suggested that the EPA should: (1) target its environmental
protection efforts where they would result in the greatest risk reduction, (2) attach as much
importance to ecological risk as to reducing human health risks, (3) improve risk research and
analytical methods, (4) and (5) reflect risk-based priorities in strategic planning and budget
processes, (6) make better use of "all the tools available" to reduce risk, (7) focus on prevention of
pollution instead of reactive measures, (8) incorporate environmental considerations into broader
aspects of public policy, (9) work to improve public understanding of environmental risks, and (10)
develop improved analytical methods to value natural resources and account for long-term enviro-
economic effects. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 8. The SAB continued:
Moreover, great uncertainty often is associated with the data that do exist.
Exposure and toxic response models, the numbers used to quantify risks, and
variation in individual susceptibility to risks are often highly uncertain. Without
more and better data, conclusions about relative risk will be tenuous and will
depend in large measure on professional judgement.
Id. (emphasis added).
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a relative value component." Data and gaps in data are used by competing
interest groups to further their own interests when they attempt to shape risk
assessment and guidelines.65 Such use and misuse of science in policymaking
point out the enormous complexities of factoring scientific advice and expertise
into regulatory policy.66 "If the scientific claims that these bodies [committees
like the SAB] are asked to evaluate are uncertain, insufficient, and inherently
mixed with policy, then how can advisers selected for their technical expertise
and political neutrality possibly certify them as valid science?"67
The answer is that current regulatory practices and conclusions are simply
not the result of pure science, but rather of scientific best-guesses.6"
Characterizing regulations as the result of purely scientific activity, however,
reduces political accountability for these judgments and obscures underlying, and
frequently inconsistent, policy rationales.69 Some commentators have described
this as subterfuge designed to accomplish de facto deregulation.7" Others have
noted that a typical consequence of requiring regulators to address currently
unanswerable scientific questions is agency paralysis.7 A brief appraisal of a
"science first" approach to regulation demonstrates the need for greater public
input and protection through tort law.
1. Methodological Problems in the Scientific Approach
Significant debate over methodology employed to evaluate and compare
risks has stymied efforts to generate a consistent approach to correcting
environmental problems.72 On a technical level, experts disagree over the
extrapolative models, statistical methods, and cost-benefit comparisons used to
evaluate health risks in the environment.73 Furthermore, experts do not even
agree on appropriate exposure baselines for health risks, some claiming that the
harms generated by natural risks outweigh the harms that stem from man-made
64. See Robert F. Blomquist, The EPA Science Advisory Board's Report on "Reducing Risk, " 22
ENVTL. L. 149, 181 n.139 (1992); see generally JASANOFF, supra note 57, at 1-18 (1990).
65. Blomquist, supra note 64, at 181 n.139.
66. Id. at 181.
67. JASANOFF, supra note 57, at 8-9.
68. See Latin, supra note 5, at 94 ("Risk assessors often respond to scientific uncertainties by
adopting conservative safety-oriented positions on some important issues while they use best-current-
scientific-guess, middle-of-the-range, methodological-convenience, or least-cost treatments on other
material issues.").
69. Id. at 93-94.
70. Id. at 94-95 (citing Dr. J. Donald Millar, former Director of the National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health, and Vice President Al Gore).
71. Id. at 106.
72. See Jimmie Powell, Defining the Undefinable: What Risks Are Acceptable?, ENVTL. FORUM,
Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 22, 22.
73. See Latin, supra note 5, at 92.
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risks.74 Ultimately, the debate focuses on where the risks of uncertainty in
scientific assessment should be allocated.75
The development of procedures to establish national guidelines for
carcinogen exposure provides a good example of these problems. Because of the
complex and poorly-understood mechanisms which stimulate oncogenic processes,
a perfect model for testing existing or potential carcinogens has not yet been
created.76 Data on low-level exposure to known or suspected carcinogens "cannot
be measured directly either by animal experiments or by epidemiological
studies."77 As a result, scientists and regulators must extrapolate from high-level
exposure data in an attempt to predict what low-level human exposures will create
a significant health threat.7"
Although a number of extrapolative models exists, none has been widely
accepted.79 The results of using one model as compared to another may vary by
several orders of magnitude, and the range of uncertainty has been compared to
"not knowing whether one has enough money to buy a cup of coffee or pay off
the national debt."'  Obviously, the selection of one particular model may
generate controversy depending on the severity of the regulations promulgated
under the chosen model.
Administrative endorsement of certain toxic-exposure risk models reflects
political and economic policy choices which have significant impact in terms of
potential health effects and regulatory efficiency. For instance, during the Carter
Administration, the EPA adopted carcinogen exposure guidelines which estimated
minimum safety levels using a very conservative extrapolation model."' This
policy maximized safety in circumstances of persistent uncertainty but might have
produced overly stringent regulation by placing the costs of uncertainty and risk
of error on industry.82
The Reagan Administration changed the exposure guideline policies,
requiring that EPA experts assess risks independently on the weight of available
evidence for each potentially regulated substance. 3 Under this approach,
74. See Huber, supra note 45, at 291 ("The natural state of the world is not safety but abundant
(though often natural) hazard .... Nature, the greatest risk producer of all, cannot be made to pay
for her abundant production of risk.").
75. See Latin, supra note 5, at 125-26.
76. See generally STANLEY L. ROBBINS ET AL., THE PATHOLOGIC BASIS OF DISEASE (1994).
77. EPA Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,997 (1986).
78. See Latin, supra note 5, at 98.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 92 (citing Cothem et al., Estimating Risk to Human Health, 20 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH.
111, 113-15 (1986)).
81. SeeOSHA, Identification, Classification and Regulation ofPotential Occupational Carcinogens,
29 C.F.R. § 1900 (1981).
82. Latin, supra note 5, at 99.
83. See EPA Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992 (1986).
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regulated interests are encouraged to present arguments in favor of the adoption
of certain extrapolative models and data which reinforce their own positions.8 4
As a result, agencies may delay regulation of potential toxins for years until the
"weight of evidence" allows sufficiently precise estimation of exposure hazards.8 5
Agencies are forced to expend valuable resources to review substances on a case-
by-case basis.86 Additionally, prolonged exposure to these unregulated toxins in
the pursuit of exact standards may ultimately create disastrous health problems
which might not have arisen under a more cautious model.87
Depending on the extrapolation model chosen, the interpretation of the
same data may result in a totally different conclusion. A recent example of this
is a review of the EPA's dioxin exposure standards which debates the adequacy
of the statistical model used by the EPA to measure the toxic effects of dioxin on
biological processes.88 This study contends that the particular biochemical
changes studied by the EPA are not, per se, the result of toxic effects of dioxin
exposure. 9
This last point underscores the unpredictable nature of pollution exposure
which creates problems affecting the accuracy of data. For example, the human
health effects of toxins may take decades to become apparent, and "well-
designed" studies of previous human exposure are rarely available.9" Toxins may
also have widely varied effects on exposure victims which are not easily grouped
or quantified because too many variables preclude accurate estimation.91 Experts
may also disagree as to which particular biological process reflects toxic
exposure.92 These problems are also present in animal studies which regulatory
experts may or may not consider when setting minimum safety thresholds for
human exposure.93
2. Procedural Concerns
In spite of obvious flaws, the lengths to which the SAB's various
subcommittees went to analyze environmental risks lend some credence to their
conclusions. As already indicated, the RRRSC was composed of an impressive
mixture of scientists, engineers, and academicians-representing public, business,
84. See Latin, supra note 5, at 100.
85. Id. at 126-27.
86. Id. at 128-29.
87. Id. at 128.
88. Rory B. Conolly, U.S. EPA Reassessmentof the Health Risks of 2,3, 7,8-Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-
dioxin (TCDD), CIIT AcTIvrrIES, Dec. 1994, at 1, 5-7.
89. Id. at 2-4.
90. Latin, supra note 5, at 102.
91. Id. at 100-03.
92. See Conolly, supra note 88, at 5.
93. Latin, supra note 5, at 103-05.
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and governmental interests.94 The RRRSC and its various subcommittees held
three working sessions and twelve public meetings before producing their
recommendations. 95 Amazingly, the Committee was able to reach a consensus,
prioritize the environmental ills of the United States, and publish its findings in
just over a year and a half.96
Although nothing in Reducing Risk indicates how much dissension and
controversy occurred between committee members, behavioral studies of group-
dynamics in general indicate that conclusions reached in this manner are not
necessarily the best. In the early 1970s, Dr. Irving L. Janis coined the term
"groupthink," describing the process by which people in committees or groups
tend to suppress divergent views and engage in less critical and objective thinking
in an effort to reach consensus. 97 More recent studies of group behavior indicate
that a variety of factors may contribute to good or bad decisions but that the
results are not as dramatic as suggested by Janis's studies.98 Regardless, the
conclusions reached by these studies should encourage more scrutiny of group
policy recommendations like those of the RRRSC.99
3. Congress and Risk Assessment
For better or worse, the present Congress is wholeheartedly embracing the
cost-benefit model of risk assessment and prioritization. Several bills presently
under development in the House of Representatives and Senate deal with
regulatory "reform," ' and one specifically proposes the imposition of cost-
94. See REDUCING RISK, supra note 21, at iv (listing all RRRSC members).
95. Id. at 5.
96. Id. at ii.
97. See IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND
FIASCOES 4 (2d. ed. 1983); see also Clark McCauley, The Nature ofSocial Influence in Groupthink:
Compliance and Internalization, 57 J. PERSONAL AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 250, 251 (1989) ("Groupthink
is concurrence-seeking that interferes with adequate consideration of decision alternatives, which
in turn leads to poor decisions.").
98. See Decision Making: How Presidents Think, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 8, 8
(discussing recent study by Berkeley social psychologist Philip Tetlock).
99. Blomquist, supra note 64, at 186. Blomquist notes that:
While EPA should unquestionably provide ample opportunity for public
comment and input before accepting or implementing any of the SAB
recommendations as a matter of public policy, in light of the weight that will
be accorded the SAB Reducing Risk analysis in future policy deliberations, it
would have been wise to have provided public input at the earlier stage of
scientific and policy negotiations.
Id.
100. S. 343, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (introduced in Senate as "Comprehensive Regulatory
Reform Act of 1995" and presently on floor of Senate); H.R. 450, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(proposed as "Regulatory Transition Act of 1995," but later became part of S. 219).
1995]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
benefit risk assessment procedures for all federal regulations."°  If this bill
becomes law, it would require all federal regulatory programs to perform
extensive cost-benefit analyses of comparative risks and risk management choices
before agencies devote funds to regulatory programs or set regulatory priorities.'02
As a result, critics have attacked the bill for making economics one of the
primary concerns of regulatory actions.0 3
The new risk assessment bill incorporates many of the recommendations
in Reducing Risk, citing as its purposes: (1) presentation of the most scientifically
objective and unbiased information for sound regulatory decisions and public
education, (2) full consideration and discussion of relevant data and potential
methodologies, (3) explanation of significant choices in the assessment process,
and (4) improved consistency in executive branch preparations of risk assessments
and characterizations. 4 Though the bill does not include any express preemption
language, its enactment would strengthen inferred preemption arguments because
all agencies would have to perform a fairly exhaustive cost-benefit analysis before
implementing any programs.'0 5 Whether this bill would change preemption
jurisprudence remains to be seen.
B. Excluding the Public Voice from Environmental Affairs: Public v. Expert Risk
Assessment
The notion that experts-whose judgments inform both lawmakers and
courts-do not agree on key points, regardless of the certainty of scientific data,
is troubling for a variety of reasons. First, public opinion, often dismissed as
"irrational" or unworkable by technocrats and policymakers alike,"°' is being
excluded in favor of scientific assessment of risk, which is not an entirely
101. H.R. 1022, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (entitled "Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of
1995" and has become part of H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)).
102. Id. § 104.
103. See Jessica Matthews, Horror in the House, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1995, at C7 ("If [the risk-
reduction bill] becomes law, cost-effectiveness and 'flexibility' (left undefined for the courts to
figure out) will replace" statutes such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act that make "health,
safety, or environmental protection the guiding standard.").
104. H.R. 1022, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 104 (1995).
105. Moreover, the bill specifically mentions that the scientific cost-benefit procedures will apply
to "[a]ny proposed or final permit condition placing a restriction on facility siting or operation under
Federal laws administered by the EPA or the Department of the Interior." Id. § 103(b)(2)(B)(iii).
The bill also applies to regulatory actions which place new substances on official lists of
carcinogens, toxic, or hazardous substances, or place a new health-effects value on the list. Id. §
103(b)(2)(B)(v).
106. See Warren T. Brookes, The Wasteful Pursuit of Zero Risk, FORBES, Apr. 30, 1990, at 160,
161 (describing public perception of risk as emotional, and based on misinformation, disinformation,
and the faulty use of statistics); see also ALONZO PLOUGH & SHELDON KRIMSKY, ENVIRONMENTAL
HAZARDS 303 (1988) (concluding that studies in risk perception reinforce conception that rationality
and democracy are antagonistic to one another).
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superior approach to addressing environmental problems. Second, preemptive
federal laws based entirely on the value judgments and "best guesses" of experts
would further erode public trust in legitimate regulatory attempts to deal with
pollution and might exacerbate obstructionist public sentiments toward any
government interference, regardless of the benefits federal regulation might
provide.
Admittedly, public perception of risk often differs markedly from a
scientific, probabilistic determination of risk."°7 Critics attribute this difference
to the increased role that various psychological effects play in public risk
assessment and to the absence of these factors in the evaluation of the same risks
using the laws of probability."0 ' The key problem faced by policymakers,
therefore, is the integration of valid public concerns and scientific expertise to
satisfy the goals of efficiency and consistency in environmental policy without
destroying core democratic values."09
The degree of participation which the general public and scientific experts
should exercise in the formation of environmental policy is yet another source of
contention among scholars and experts alike."0 Suggestions to incorporate public
input in the regulatory process, such as the use of "citizen panels" to inform
decisionmakers of public concern, have yielded positive results and improved
public trust in official decisions."' Unfortunately, not all federal environmental
laws mandate the use of such panels.
In reality, existing federal environmental laws do not afford meaningful
opportunities for public participation." 2 Under current procedures, it is unlikely
that the public will be willing to sit vigilantly through long technical public
hearings on proposed regulations or even to think to consider the ramifications
107. See Frank B. Cross, The Public Role in Risk Control, 24 ENVTL. L. 887, 888 (1994)
(analyzing difference between public and probabilistic determinations of risk).
108. Critics have postulated that public perception of risks is heavily influenced not only by
cognitive factors, but also by selective media exposure and misinformation. Id. at 897-912.
109. See Susan G. Hadden, Public Perception of Hazardous Waste, 11 RISK ANALYSIS 47, 51
(1991) (suggesting that government must find way to reach compromise position because it is
impossible to change or ignore public opinion).
110. Cross, supra note 107, at 894-95, 894 n.28. See also E. Donald Elliot, The Future of Toxic
Torts: Of Chemophobia, Risk as a Compensable Injury and Hybrid Compensation Systems, 25
Hous. L. REv. 781, 782 (1988):
[T]oxic tort cases are about redefining our public morality for a new era in
which we must confront the troubling truth that we do not fully comprehend the
relationships between the things that we have made and our health and
well-being.
... [Toxic tort cases] involve basic controversies over evolving public
values; these are fundamental political issues that experts have no greater right
to resolve than anyone else in a democratic society.
111. See SUSAN G. HADDEN, A CITIZEN'S RIGHT To KNOW 208-09 (1989).
112. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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of proposed federal laws before they suffer an injury and discover that they have
no cause of action. Therefore, until lawmakers create a better procedure to
incorporate both public concerns and valid science into the development of
federal regulations, the courts must handle the harms which inevitably slip
through the regulatory cracks.
C. Addressing Immediate Environmental Problems: The Adequacy of the Judicial
System
While matters of public health and safety have been associated
traditionally with state police powers,' 3 critics assert that state judicial review of
environmental harms without regard to regulatory standards does more harm than
good." '4 The general argument for excluding courts from the regulatory process
involves a few central premises: (1) experts and regulatory agencies are better
suited to perform the cost-benefit analysis necessary to establish progressive risk
assessment and management strategies," 5 (2) judicial intervention and regulation
will stifle new beneficial technologies and mirror inaccurate public bias toward
"public risks,""' 6 and (3) new technologies are inevitably safer than the old or
natural alternatives they replace." 7
As discussed, expert environmental risk assessment is typically not an
unbiased nor scientifically certain process, and it may not adequately reflect valid
public concerns."' Though regulatory agencies may appear facially competent
to make carefully the best risk-reducing choices, their insights may often depend
more on guesswork than on science. The chore of regulating pollution must not
be their exclusive domain." 9
The remaining critical argument focuses on the wisdom of allowing
judicial intervention in the regulatory process: Is state tort law compatible with
113. See, e.g., Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
114. See Huber, supra note 45, at 278 (suggesting that present judicial role hinders progress
towards healthier and safer environment).
115. Id. at 333.
116. Id. at 277 (defining public risks as "threats to human health or safety that are centrally or
mass-produced, broadly distributed, and largely outside the individual risk bearer's direct
understanding and control").
117. See id.
118. See generally Cross, supra note 107.
119. In his remarkably prophetic book Future Shock, Alvin Toffler writes:
[T]echnological questions can no longer be answered in technological terms
alone. They are political questions.... We cannot permit them to be dictated
by short-run economic considerations alone. We cannot permit them to be
made in a policy vacuum. And we cannot delegate responsibility for such
decisions to businessmen, scientists, engineers or administrators who are
unaware of the profound consequences of their own actions.
ALvIN TOFFLER, FuTuRE SHOCK 386-87 (1970).
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federal environmental objectives of risk reduction? The central purposes of tort
law are to allocate the losses arising out of human activities and to afford
compensation for injuries sustained by one person as the result of the conduct of
another.'20 Even critics admit that the judicial system is well-suited to resolving
"easily ascertained," antisocial, and injurious conduct.' 2 ' When environmental
harms are the subject of judicial review, however, these critics accuse courts of
making regressive risk choices which hinder the overall effectiveness of risk-
reducing strategies forwarded by agencies.'22 These accusations fail to consider
other goals of the tort system and overstate the importance of showing absolute
deference to federal regulatory schemes.
Individuals generally do not sue for every public harm they suffer.
People who sue polluters have severe and demonstrable harms,'23 and forcing
polluters to pay for these harms appropriately internalizes the actual costs incurred
by the polluting enterprise. Courts are appropriate forums for the amelioration
of obvious harms; the fact that verdicts which compensate plaintiffs have a
regulatory effect is incidental.
While a national environmental policy based on accurate scientific
information may result in the overall reduction of public risk,'24 actionable
environmental harms are typically discrete and local by nature. Additionally,
surveys on the location of polluting activities indicate that a disproportionate
number of poor and minority communities are host to these undesirable
enterprises. '  The judicial system is well-suited to remedy this inequitable
situation. Allowing federal legislation to preempt state tort law would thus have
a discriminatory effect; it would force the communities most affected by polluting
activity to bear the costs which are more appropriately borne and distributed by
the polluting industry.
Another advantage of the tort system is the relative speed with which
immediate environmental harms are addressed.'26 Whereas legislation dealing
120. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (5th ed.
1984).
121. Huber, supra note 45, at 331.
122. Id. at 335.
123. In fact, plaintiffs will not have standing to sue unless they are the victims of clearly
demonstrable "private" injury. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 898-99 (1990)
(holding that plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate personal harm entitling them to sue agency under
federal statutory scheme).
124. See Huber, supra note 45, at 279 (arguing that greater private safety may be achieved by
greater acceptance of public risk).
125. See ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
1-6 (1990).
126. That is not to say that industry will not use every means at its disposal to wear plaintiffs down
by attrition-dragging lawsuits out over years to deplete plaintiffs' resources, as seen in notable
mass tort cases involving asbestos or medical products like the Dalkon Shield. See Jack B.
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with specific environmental problems may take years to enact and implement,
court actions such as simple nuisance cases can either compensate pollution
victims in the interim or enjoin the polluting activity altogether. Immediate
attention to environmental harms becomes increasingly important as industry
escalates its production of new chemical compounds which are not regulated until
they are proven to cause damage to human health and the environment.
127
In 1984, the National Research Council ("Council") noted that toxicity
data was not available for over eighty percent of the 48,000 commonly used
chemical substances in commercial use. 128 The Council also indicated that 65,725
of the chemical compounds in existence at that time were sources of possible
toxic concern.129 This data does not consider the potentially hazardous interaction
of these compounds in the environment when they are dumped or discharged.
Additionally, under EPA guidelines, the regulated industries seeking agency
approval usually perform the studies to determine the potential toxicity of any
compound. 3° This "fox-in-charge-of-the-henhouse" system of regulation does not
generate much faith in the process and implicitly invites the additional safeguard
of tort liability-in case one or two hazardous compounds manage to avoid
regulatory scrutiny before they wreak havoc.
By far, the largest source of dissension between advocates and opponents
of court intervention concerns the effect which tort actions have on the invention
of new, risk-reducing technology. Opponents of court regulation point to such
examples as the elimination of vaccine production as the result of tort liability and
the resulting difficulties manufacturers had in obtaining adequate insurance.' 3' In
theory, they claim that this sort of liability will lead to the destruction of all
market incentive to produce any new, potentially safer vaccines.
132
This argument failed to convince the Supreme Court in Hillsborough
Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469, 479 (1994).
127. See Raymond A. Bendele, Safety Assessment Programs for U.S. Regulatory Agencies: A
Perspective of Requirements and Compliance, 22 Toxic PATHOLOGY 95, 102 (1994) (detailing
EPA's requirements for new chemical substances under Toxic Substances Control Act).
128. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOxICITY TESTING: STRATEGIES To DETERMINE NEEDS
AND PRIORITIES (1984).
129. Id.
130. See Bendele, supra note 127, at 102-03. Proposed bills which would have banned the use of
known toxins or required industry to reveal the potential effects and chemical structures of new
compounds under a community right-to-know act have consistently been met with hostility by
regulated interests. See John H. Sheridan, Getting Tougher with Toxics, INDUSTRY WEEK, Feb. 17,
1992, at 46, 46.
131. Vaccines, while eliminating diseases such as whooping cough and polio, may have adverse
health effects on some recipients. For instance, the American Medical Association reported risk
statistics for a variety of vaccines which ranged from I in 312,500 (risk of brain damage from
whooping cough vaccine) to I in 3.2 million (risk of paralysis from polio vaccine). Some
manufacturers have ceased to produce vaccines because of onerous tort liability. See Huber, supra
note 45, at 285 & n.35, 286-90.
132. Id. at 289-90.
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County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc.,'" where the Court held that
state regulation of plasmapheresis centers was not preempted by federal
regulation. In that case, plasmapheresis centers complained that compliance with
the additional requirements of state regulations would "present a serious obstacle
to the federal goal of ensuring an 'adequate supply of plasma."" 34 The centers
bolstered their argument by pointing to the increased financial burdens
necessitated by compliance and speculated that this would have the effect of
reducing the number of plasma centers. 3 '
The Court affirmed the lower court's finding that the centers' cost-of-
compliance estimates were "clouded with speculation" and noted that, even if the
number of plasma centers were reduced, that effect would not necessarily interfere
with the federal goal of maintaining an adequate supply of plasma. 36
Hillsborough County, when applied to the preemption arguments of industrial
polluters, suggests that industries must produce more than speculative claims that
state tort law would impede federal objectives by driving the industries out of
business.
The Court also rejected preemption arguments made by the nuclear
industry in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation
& Development Commission. 37 In that case, the California Public Resources
Code allowed the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development
Commission to determine the adequacy of storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel
on a case-by-case basis.1 3' The Court held that the state regulations could
harmoniously coexist with federal reactor-safety standards because the regulations
focused on economic concerns surrounding nuclear waste disposal. 39 Though
these state regulations may have had the effect of dampening the existing nuclear
technologies, it allowed for the development of new nuclear waste disposal
technology which could reduce concerns about the potentially high costs of
storing radioactive wastes. "'
More recently, in the milestone case of Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,'4'
the Supreme Court held that the pervasive regulatory scheme of the Price-
Anderson Act, a federal statute that granted the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
133. 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
134. Id. at 720.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
138. Id. at 203.
139. Id. at 212.
140. Id. at 214.
141. 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (holding that appropriate test to determine scope of preemption
concerning radiation injuries was whether there is irreconcilable conflict between federal and state
standards or whether imposition of state standard would frustrate objectives of federal law).
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exclusive authority to regulate safety matters, does not preempt state tort punitive
damages for illegal conduct. 142 In so doing, the Court noted that there was no
obvious indication that Congress intended to preclude state tort remedies and that
it would be difficult to believe that Congress would remove all means of judicial
recourse for personal injuries without comment.'43 To date, despite the holdings
of Pacific Gas and Silkwood, California's nuclear industry shows no signs of
going out of business as a result of its tort liability.
Finally, in International Union, United Auto, Aerospace & Agricultural
Implement Workers of America, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,'44 the Court
discussed the threat of tort liability posed by potential fetal injury claims. In that
case, the Court held that Title VII prohibited employers in the lead industry from
imposing discriminatory regulations on female employees under the guise of
protecting fetal health.' 45 The industry complained that it would still be
vulnerable to tort suits from employees despite its compliance with federal
regulations. Although the Court did not rule on the viability of this specific
argument, it did note that, "[w]ithout negligence, it would be difficult for a court
to find liability on the part of the employer" if it adequately warned potential
mothers of the hazards of fetal injury from workplace lead contamination.146
When these cases are viewed in conjunction with one another, it is clear
that courts are interested in resolving inequitable situations in a just and
evenhanded manner-contrary to the notion that tort damages are "spinning like
a top that ... runs wild in our country.' 47 This "distributive justice," in effect,
acts to balance an imperfectly functioning market by forcing industries to
internalize the real costs of doing business-whether damage from environmental
pollution or the health costs of a hazardous product. 41 Industries may then
distribute these costs to consumers.
Therefore, assuming that polluting activity will still create environmental
and health hazards, removing tort liability would subsidize the continuing harm.
At this point, the vaccine argument buckles: the public beneficiaries of vaccine
technology must be willing to compensate the one-in-a-million victim who reacts
142. Id. at 252.
143. Id. at 251;seealso United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1954).
144. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
145. Id. at 211.
146. Id. at 208.
147. Inside Business (CNN television broadcast, Feb. 26, 1995) (comment on punitive damages by
Victor Schwartz, representative of Product Liability Coordinating Council, abusinessgroup seeking
limits on damage awards) [hereinafter Inside Business].
148. See PLATER ET AL., supra note 19, at 49 (discussing economic correction of externalities
through privatization of common resources); see also H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS
(1987).
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adversely to the drug.' 49 Removing a victim's right to sue for injuries forces her
to bear unjustly the entire cost of mandatory vaccination for all who paid an
artificially low price for the program's benefit. Though personal sacrifice for
public welfare is a noble act, a democratic society must ensure that this choice
remains voluntary. The same holds true for communities that host polluting
industries-such as coal-burning power generation centers, hazardous waste
storage facilities, and oil refineries.
Interestingly enough, the SAB recommended market incentives as one of
six strategic methods for reducing risks.' State tort liability is one of the most
potent market forces, reflected in the arguments of its advocates and opponents.'1
5
It should come as no surprise that as the costs of polluting activities increase as
the result of lawsuits, other more expensive "eco-friendly" alternatives grow more
attractive.
Finally, some commentators remind us that "our legal system is not
entirely goal-oriented. It embodies certain basic constitutional ideals, such as
preserving and promoting equal access to justice, human liberty, [and] property
rights. These values reject an entirely instrumental view of law dominated by
utilitarian assessments of law's efficacy in achieving various goals."' Federal
lawmakers should factor these frequently forgotten values into their cost-benefit
calculus before they act to preempt state tort remedies in any legislative scheme.
To summarize: "[U]nderstanding [the] limitations of science and the social
interpretation of science, combined with a too often overlooked appreciation of
how a democracy shapes its morality, will better serve the ideal of achieving a
democratically acceptable approach to the difficult questions involved in doing
justice."''
D. Tort Remedies as Property Interests: Due Process and the Fifth Amendment
Any congressional attempt to supplant state law remedies with inadequate
federal statutory schemes of recovery, either expressly or impliedly in the name
of "regulatory uniformity," should be seen as an intrusion on one of the most
important rights of our citizens: the right of redress in the courts. In Chambers
149. Another interesting note: "The National Center for State Courts... reports that business-to-
business lawsuits far outnumber the suits filed by individuals seeking to right a wrong." Inside
Business, supra note 147.
150. REDUCING RISK, supra note 21, at 15 ("A key to reducing environmental risk is to ensure that
consumers and producers face the full costs of their decisions. Economic incentives can often help
accomplish this end.").
151. See Inside Business, supra note 147.
152. See Alan Kanner, Continuity and Change in Toxic Tort Litigation, C855 ALI-ABA 651, 671
(1992) (footnotes omitted).
153. Id. at 674-75.
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v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,' 54 the Supreme Court stated: "The right to sue and defend
in the courts is the alternative of force. In an organized society it is the right
conservative of all other rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly government.
It is one of the highest and most essential privileges of citizenship."' 55
Furthermore, the powerful remedies afforded by state tort causes of action
are not only an effective means of alleviating environmental harms suffered by
the public, but they have also been recognized as property rights' 56 protected by
the Due Process and Takings Clauses.'57 The right of judicial access affords
citizens a "meaningful opportunity to be heard"' 58 and protects their ability to
redress effectively personal injuries. The ability to bring a cause of action for
harms suffered at the hands of polluting industries should be seen as a
fundamental right inherent in the concept of ordered liberty and as a right that is
necessary to protect other expressly defined constitutional rights. 59
If congressional preemption of state tort law may be seen as a taking of
property requiring due process, are citizens afforded enough procedural or
substantive "process" before federal law preempts their ability to sue for injury?
To answer this question, courts must determine whether the government action:
(1) has a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, (2) is neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory, and (3) rationally advances a reasonable and
identifiable government objective. 60 The courts also must examine the degree of
the private burden suffered by an individual as a result of the government
regulation. ' 6' Assuming that Congress has the authority to create environmental
protection laws and that such laws are reasonably related to legislative police
powers to protect health, safety, and welfare, only the "arbitrary and
154. 207 U.S. 142 (1907).
155. Id. at 148.
156. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 281-82 (1980) (noting that "[airguably" a state tort
claim is a "species of 'property' protected by the Due Process Clause"); see also Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) (holding that a cause of action is species of
property protected by Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
157. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 539-40 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (stating that adequacy and availability of state tort actions have always been issues
under Takings and Due Process Clauses).
158. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379-80 (1971) (interpreting Due Process Clause as
preventing states from denying potential litigants use of established adjudicatory procedures when
such an action would be equivalent to "denying them an opportunity to be heard upon their claimed
right[s]"); seealso Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 n.5 (1982) ("[H]aving made
access to the courts an entitlement or a necessity, the State may not deprive someone of that access
unless the balance of state and private interests favors the government scheme.").
159. This argument to extend implicit constitutional rights is the same used by the Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (deeming that certain rights lie within penumbra of
expressly listed fundamental rights).
160. See Zygmunt J. Plater & William L. Norine, Through the Looking Glass of Eminent Domain,
16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 661, 707-12 (1989).
161. Id.
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discriminatory" and private burden inquiries remain.
In the case of Martinez v. California,'62 the parents of a fifteen-year-old
murder victim attempted to sue the state on the basis that a statute which
conferred tort immunity on parole officials was a taking of private property in
violation of due process. The Court admitted that "[a]rguably, the cause of action
for wrongful death that the State has created is a species of 'property' protected
by the Due Process Clause."'163  The Court continued, stating that "the State's
interest in fashioning its own rules of tort law is paramount to any discernible
federal interest, except perhaps an interest in protecting the individual citizen from
state action that is wholly arbitrary or irrational. 64
Though the Court did not find a violation of due process in that case, it
did lay the foundation for future decisions. 65 In fact, the Court found that due
process requirements could be violated when "notice given through newspaper
publication" deprived beneficiaries of every cause of action they might have
against a trust company for improper management of the common fund. 16 6 "Such
a result was impermissible unless constitutionally adequate notice and hearing
procedures were established before the settlement process went into effect."' 167 To
reinforce its conclusion, the Court noted that it "traditionally has held that the
Due Process Clauses protect civil litigants who seek recourse in the courts, either
as defendants hoping to protect their property or as plaintiffs attempting to redress
grievances."' 68
This precedent suggests that federal courts should seriously consider
whether present methods of soliciting "public comment" on proposed
environmental regulations would ever fulfill due process, especially if such
162. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
163. Id. at 281-82.
164. Id.
165. Id. The Court's due process analysis concluded:
[Tihere "is a rational relationship between the state's purposes and the statute."
In fashioning state policy in a "practical and troublesome area" like this... the
California Legislature could reasonably conclude that judicial review ofaparole
officer's decisions "would inevitably inhibit the exercise of discretion." That
inhibiting effect could impair the State's ability to implement a parole program
designed to promote rehabilitation of inmates as well as security within prison
walls by holding out a promise of potential rewards. Whether one agrees or
disagrees with California's decision to provide absolute immunity for parole
officials in a case of this kind, one cannot deny that it rationally furthers a
policy that reasonable lawmakers may favor. As federal judges, we have no
authority to pass judgment on the wisdom of the underlying policy
determination.
Id. at 282-83 (footnotes and citations omitted).
166. Logan, 455 U.S. at 429 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 311).
167. Id.
168. Id.
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regulations, designed to protect human and environmental welfare, act to deprive
the public of the means of protecting themselves. This incongruous method of
attaining environmental health and welfare, when considered with the abysmally
random and subjective methods regulators use to design environmental
regulations, could easily be seen as arbitrary or irrational government action.
Considering the ultimate burden pollution victims will bear at the hands of such
measures, court remedies must be preserved to satisfy minimum due process
requirements.
Deprivation of a citizen's ability to seek redress for personal injuries in
state courts may rise to the level of a taking of property that warrants just
compensation. Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in Hudson v.
Palmer, 169 stated:
The Constitution requires the government, if it deprives people
of their property, to provide due process of law and to make just
compensation for any takings. The due process requirement
means that Government must provide . . . the remedies it
promised would be available. Concomitantly, the just
compensation requirement means that the remedies made
available must adequately compensate for any takings that have
occurred. 7 0
By identifying the Takings Clause as a possible constitutional basis for
compensating victims of "official" or state-generated torts, Justice O'Connor's
approach suggests that a state's refusal to compensate the victims of its torts on
the grounds of sovereign immunity should be considered a taking of private
property.' 7 ' This line of reasoning could be logically extended to afford
protection to tort victims' property interests in state tort remedies.
Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co.'72 supports this idea. In Ruckleshaus,
Monsanto sued to recover damages for the taking of the company's intellectual
property. 73 Monsanto claimed that the mandatory disclosure provisions in the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act forced the company to
reveal trade secrets, thereby effecting a taking of this intellectual property without
169. 468 U.S. 517, 537-40 (1984).
170. Id. at 539 (footnotes omitted) (finding that claimant must either avail himself of remedies
guaranteed by state law or prove that available remedies are inadequate when claiming that property
deprivation constitutes "taking").
171. Jack M. Beermann, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism and State
Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REv. 277, 283 (1988).
172. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
173. Id. at 998-99.
174. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 987 (1972)
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988)).
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just compensation.' The Court classified the trade secrets as property rights
"that [were] created and ... defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law."' 76  The Court's analysis also
focused on the characteristics shared by intangible trade secrets and other tangible
forms of property rights, such as the ability to assign the interest, form the res
of a trust, or pass the interest to a trustee in bankruptcy.' Finally, the Court
noted that it recognized other intangible property rights as deserving of
protection of the Takings Clause although such property did not conform to the
traditional notion of property.'78
The property analogy is easily extended to the interests a tort victim
possesses in state tort remedies. The ability to bring a cause of action is specific
to the injured party and is generally protective of some other property right which
is demonstrably harmed. The ability to sue, however, may be transferred or
assigned, such as when insurance companies are subrogated to the rights of policy
claimants on the basis of contract law. The interest a person has in pursuing a
state tort claim may also be subjected to a variety of theoretical analyses with a
high degree of success.'
The Court in Ruckleshaus also focused on three other questions
concerning the property interest: (1) Did the government act effect a taking of
the property? (2) If so, was the taking for public use? and (3) If there were a
taking for public use, did the federal statute adequately provide for just
compensation? 0 Considering the convoluted nature of the Court's takings
jurisprudence' 8 ' and the ad hoc, factual inquiry into whether a taking has
occurred,1 2 it is difficult to postulate whether the Court would recognize a "new"
175. Ruckleshaus, 467 U.S. at 998-99.
176. Id. at 1001.
177. Id at 1002.
178. Id. at 1003 (Justice Blackmun listing liens and valid contracts among protected intangible
interests, both of which may be aptly characterized as interests in set of legal relations).
179. For example, using Jeremy Bentham's definition of property as a "legally protected
expectation of being able to draw such or such an advantage from the thing in question according
to the nature of the case," one could argue that the right to pursue a common law tort claim is
legally protected and endorsed by the law of each state and that only the person injured may possess
that right to "draw advantage" from tort law to remedy his injury. Such loose and expanding
concepts of modem property are easily exploited to fit such intangible interests. See ROGER A.
CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 1 (2d ed. 1993).
180. Ruckleshaus, 467 U.S. at 1000-01.
181. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1979) (admitting that the Court has
been unable to develop any set formula for determining when economic injuries caused by public
action constitute a taking); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(holding that taking did not occur when property owner was afforded reasonable return on
investment); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304 (1987) (holding that temporary deprivation of property amounted to compensable taking).
182. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175.
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property interest. The argument may be made, however, to show that where
regulatory action or federal law expressly preempts all state tort remedies in order
to foster uniform national pollution standards, individual victims who are not
fully compensated under the federal schemes for their pollution-related injuries
should not be forced "to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole."' 3
II1. PROGRESS AT WHAT COST?
In 1969, Congress suggested implementing legislation that would have
granted "each person . . . a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful
environment."' 84 Presently, legislators are making a concerted effort to insulate
industrial polluters and other wrongdoers from tort liability, suggesting that the
tort system has run amok and is stifling the nation's economic growth and
competitiveness.'85 As a society, we must consider the wisdom of this approach
toward solving environmental problems and should ask ourselves and our elected
officials where our priorities lie.
In his book Future Shock, 86 Alvin Toffler prophesied that humankind
would suffer increasing difficulties in adapting to everyday life if it allowed
technological advancement to progress without sufficient reflection and control.'87
For this reason, our government created agencies such as the EPA with noble
goals in mind: the protection of the health and welfare of biosphere and
demosphere alike. These agencies were supposed to engage in the careful
planning needed for long-term comprehensive reduction of manmade pollutants.
Unfortunately, unrelenting industrial, economic, and political pressures have
thwarted the abilities of regulators to pursue zealously standards for our well-
being. Standards attempt to reach a compromise between the polluters and the
polluted, and no one leaves the table satisfied.
The civil justice system of this country, albeit imperfect, attempts to
correct for the inadequacies of the regulatory framework. Regulators and
lawmakers, besides existing in a climate of competing special interests, must rely
on inadequate data and questionable methodologies when deciding how much risk
183. First English, 482 U.S. at 319 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
184. See PLATER ET AL., supra note 19, at 600 (discussing original language contained in draft
versions of National Environmental Policy Act of 1970; drafters deleted this language before bill's
passage into law).
185. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
186. TOFFLER, supra note 119.
187. Toffler urged society to consider the side effects of new technologies in terms of their effects
on the environment, culture, value systems, and psychological well-being of humankind: "We can
no longer afford to let such [effects] just 'happen.' . . . Where these effects are likely to be seriously
damaging, we must also be prepared to block the new technology. It is as simple as that.
Technology cannot be permitted to rampage through the society." Id. at 388.
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society should accept. These decisions are made in a vacuum: public comment
may be accepted before regulations are implemented, but no real effort is made
to incorporate certain "irrational" public concerns which may have legitimate
value components. As a result, state torts may be the only means of redressing
privately suffered harms generated by polluters who comply with federal "safety"
standards.
Far from destroying our nation's economic productivity, however, tort
liability encourages industries to develop new safer technologies: double-hulled
tankers and pickup trucks with gas tanks inside the chassis are prime examples.
Though critics may claim that public unwillingness to accept increased risk may
have the effect of removing beneficial products from the market, the solution is
not to remove the ability to sue but to distribute the costs of risks through realistic
industry pricing. We must not require some members of our society to bear the
costs of "unavoidable" risks for the greater public good--everyone must pay their
fair share. Though this application of "distributive justice" may not satisfy all
interests, legislators should not be hasty to discard the system if no adequate
alternatives exist.
Environmental problems require complex solutions and a great deal of
circumspection. Our health and the well-being of the biosphere are at stake.
Though solutions entail inevitable costs, the sacrifice of individual justice is one
we cannot afford even though we are led to believe that it is for our own good.
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